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Abstract—Recent years have seen the rise of more sophisticated
attacks including advanced persistent threats (APTs) [14], [33],
[1], [2] which pose severe risks to organizations and governments
by targeting confidential proprietary information. Additionally,
new malware strains are appearing at a higher rate than ever
before [29]. Since many of these malware are designed to evade
existing security products, traditional defenses deployed by most
enterprises today, e.g., anti-virus, firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, often fail at detecting infections at an early stage.
We address the problem of detecting early-stage infection in
an enterprise setting by proposing a new framework based on
belief propagation inspired from graph theory. Belief propagation
can be used either with “seeds” of compromised hosts or
malicious domains (provided by the enterprise security operation
center – SOC) or without any seeds. In the latter case we
develop a detector of C&C communication particularly tailored
to enterprises which can detect a stealthy compromise of only a
single host communicating with the C&C server.
We demonstrate that our techniques perform well on detecting
enterprise infections. We achieve high accuracy with low false
detection and false negative rates on two months of anonymized
DNS logs released by Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), which
include APT infection attacks simulated by LANL domain
experts. We also apply our algorithms to 38TB of real-world
web proxy logs collected at the border of a large enterprise.
Through careful manual investigation in collaboration with the
enterprise SOC, we show that our techniques identified hundreds
of malicious domains overlooked by state-of-the-art security
products.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cybersecurity landscape is evolving constantly. More
sophisticated attacks including Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) [14], [33], [1], [2] have emerged recently targeting or-
ganizations’ intellectual property, financial assets, and national
security information. Well-funded attackers use advanced tools
and manually orchestrate their campaigns to adapt to the
victim’s environment and maintain low profiles of activity.
Additionally there are also more malware than ever before.
A whitepaper published by Panda Labs [29] found 30 million
new malware strains in circulation in 2013 alone, at an average
of 82,000 malware a day. Many of these are variants of
known malware designed to evade existing security products,
such that existing defenses, e.g., anti-virus, firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, often fail at detecting infections at an early
stage.
However, certain infection patterns still persist across mal-
ware variants and families due to the typical infection vectors
used by attackers. For example, during the malware delivery
stage, victim hosts often visit several domains under the
attacker’s control within a short period of time as a result of
redirection techniques employed by attackers to protect their
malicious infrastructures [36]. After delivery, backdoors are
installed on the compromised machines to allow footholds into
the targeted organization [26], where the machines initiate
outbound connections regularly to a command-and-control
server to receive instructions from the attacker. Malware com-
munications commonly take place over HTTP/HTTPS, since
web traffic is typically allowed by firewalls. More importantly,
domains used in the same attack campaign are often related,
meaning that they may share locality in either IP address
space, time of access or set of hosts contacting them. These
patterns of infections have been observed in advanced targeted
attacks (e.g., APT1 group [26], Shady RAT [20], Mirage [12]),
as well as botnet infections (e.g., Zeus, Citadel [13] and
ZeroAccess [23]).
In this work, we leverage these observations to detect early-
stage malware infections in enterprise networks. Our focus on
enterprises stems from their unique point of view and new
challenges present in those networks. As the victims of many
cyber attacks, enterprises are pressed on detecting infections
early to prevent further damage. However, the amount of
network traffic generated by a large enterprise can be terabytes
per day, requiring extremely efficient analysis methods to
maintain a reasonable detection time. Yet, even though there is
much data, it is of limited scope — only containing traffic as
observed from that enterprise, making prior approaches using
ISP-level data (e.g., [9], [6]) inapplicable.
We propose a graph-theoretic framework based on belief
propagation [31] to identify small communities of related
domains that are indicative of early-stage malware infections.
We first restrict our attention to traffic destined to rare desti-
nations. These are “new” domains, not visited before by any
host in the organization within an observation window (and
thus more likely to be associated with suspicious activity), and
contacted by a small number of internal hosts (since we expect
the initial infection to be small). In each iteration of our belief
propagation algorithm, the rare domains are scored according
to several features and similarity with domains detected in
previous iterations.
Our algorithm can be applied either with “hints” (starting
from “seeds” of known compromised hosts or domains), or
without (when no information about compromised hosts or
domains is given). In the first case, seeds can be obtained
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containing Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that the enter-
prise security operations center (SOC) has access to. Currently,
SOC security analysts manually investigate incidents starting
from IOCs, and we aim here to facilitate this process. In the
latter case, our method first identifies automated, regular C&C
communications that can then be used as seeds. Our C&C de-
tector leverages unique properties of enterprise networks (e.g.,
popularity of user-agent strings and web referer information in
the HTTP traffic) as well as features utilized in previous works
(e.g., timing patterns, domain age and registration validity) and
it can detect a single compromised host.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques on
two different datasets, one containing DNS records and the
other web proxy logs. The first consists of two months of
anonymized DNS records from Los Alamos National Lab
(LANL) in early 2013 amounting to 1.15TB. This dataset also
includes 20 independent APT-like infection attacks simulated
by LANL domain experts and was released along with a
challenge problem to the community (APT Infection Discovery
using DNS Data [15]) requesting methods to detect compro-
mised internal hosts and external domains in the simulated
attacks. The challenge included “hints” of varying details (e.g.,
one or multiple known compromised hosts), as well as answers
for validation. Our techniques proved effective at detecting
the LANL simulated attacks achieving an overall 98.33% true
detection rate, at the cost of 1.67% false detection rate and
6.25% false negative rate.
Our second dataset contains two months of web proxy logs
collected from a large enterprise in early 2014. Detecting ma-
licious infections in this dataset proved to be more challenging
due to its large scale (38TB of data), inconsistent information
(host IP addresses are dynamically assigned using DHCP in
most cases), and also the lack of ground truth. Through careful
manual analysis in collaboration with the enterprise SOC,
we identify hundreds of malicious domains not previously
detected by state-of-the-art security products deployed on the
enterprise network. Interestingly, a large number of these (98
distinct domains) are entirely new discoveries, not reported
yet by VirusTotal several months after we detected them. This
demonstrates the ability of our techniques to detect entirely
new, previously unknown attacks.
To summarize our main contributions in the paper are:
Belief propagation framework for detecting enterprise
infection. We develop a graph-theoretic framework based
on belief propagation for detection of early-stage enterprise
infections. Given “seed” hosts or domains, we automatically
infer other compromised hosts and related malicious domains
likely part of the same campaign. Our approach uniquely
leverages relationships among domains contacted in multiple
stages of the infection process.
Detector of C&C communication in enterprise. By exploit-
ing novel enterprise-specific features and combining them with
features used in previous work, we build a detector of C&C
communication tailored to an enterprise setting. Domains la-
beled as potential C&C can be seeded in the belief propagation
algorithm to detect other related domains.
Solve the LANL challenge. We apply the belief propagation
algorithm to the LANL challenge and identify the malicious
domains in the 20 simulated campaigns with high accuracy
and low false detection and false negative rates.
Evaluate on real-world data from large enterprise. We
apply our solution to a large dataset (38.41 TB) of web proxy
logs collected at an enterprise’s network border. We identify
hundreds of suspicious domains contacted by internal enter-
prise hosts which were not detected previously by state-of-
the-art security products. Among the 375 domains detected in
total over a month, 289 (accounting for 77.07%) are confirmed
malicious or suspicious through careful manual investigation.
While 191 (50.93%) are also reported by VirusTotal (but
unknown to the enterprise of our study), we identify 98
(26.13%) that are entirely new discoveries (not reported by
VirusTotal or the enterprise).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Our goal is to detect malware infection within an organiza-
tion in early stages of the campaign. We describe below the
characteristics of common enterprise infections (due to either
targeted or opportunistic attacks), why existing solutions fail
against such threats and the challenges we had to overcome
for detecting them.
A. Enterprise Infections
Common infection vectors for targeted attacks are social en-
gineering [26] and compromise of legitimate sites [39]. In the
case of social engineering, attackers craft legitimate-looking
spear-phishing email addressed to several employees within
the targeted organization including a malicious attachment
or a hyperlink to a malicious file. Attack vectors employed
by mainstream malware include spam emails, USB drives,
and a variety of web-based attacks (e.g., drive by download,
clickjacking, malvertising, etc.). Many of these attacks (both
targeted and mainstream) have a common pattern during early-
stage infection [26], [20], [12], [13]:
Delivery stage: During delivery, the victim machine gets
the malicious payload, for example by an email attachment,
or drive-by-download attack, etc. Many times, the first-stage
malware is generic and needs to download additional malware
(second stage) specifically crafted for the victim environ-
ment [38].
Establishing foothold: After delivery a backdoor is usually
installed on the victim’s machine and the attacker establishes
a foothold within the organization [26]. In almost all cases,
backdoors initiate outbound connections to evade firewalls that
block connections from outside the network. Most commu-
nications go through HTTP or HTTPs since these ports are
allowed by most enterprise firewalls [34], [28].
Command-and-control (C&C): Typically, backdoors connect
regularly to the command-and-control center operated by
attackers to receive further instructions and allow attackers
backdoor access into the victim environment [26], [13].
Based on these infection patterns, we extract several com-
mon characteristics of enterprise infections:
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ations to avoid detection by security products deployed within
enterprise perimeter and we focus on detecting infections with
small scale. In some cases a single host might get infected and
communicate with the C&C center.
Uncommon domains: Attackers tend to use uncommon des-
tinations for different stages of the campaign (e.g., delivery,
C&C). To examine the popularity of domains used in attacks,
we obtained a list of 14,915 IOCs reported between 2011
and 2014 from the SOC of a large enterprise. None of the
indicators are among the Alexa top one million most popu-
lar domains [4]. Additionally, [26] points out that attackers
use more frequently domain names rather than direct IP
connections for their C&C communication so that they can
dynamically flux the domains. Among the 14,915 IOCs in
the enterprise list, the vast majority (13,232 or 88.71%) are
domain names.
HTTP/HTTPs Communication. The communications be-
tween malware and C&C servers is typically done through
HTTP or HTTPs since other ports are blocked by enterprise
firewalls [34], [28].
Communities of domains: A compromised host usually
contacts several malicious domains within a relatively short
time interval. For instance, a user clicking on an embedded
link in an email might visit the front-end attacker site, get
redirected to a site hosting malicious payload and shortly after
the backdoor is established will initiate the first connection to
the C&C server. These domains form small communities ex-
hibiting similarity in connection timing, set of hosts contacting
them (if multiple hosts are infected in the same campaign) and
sometimes proximity in IP address space [19], [26].
Automated C&C communication: Backdoors typically com-
municate with C&C servers on a regular basis to allow
attackers access into the victim environment. In many pub-
licized APT campaigns (e.g., NightDragon [11], Mirage [12],
Shady RAT [20]) as well as botnet infections (e.g., Zeus,
Citadel [13], ZeroAccess [23]), C&C communication occurs
at regular time intervals (minutes or hours). We also examined
malware samples provided by Mandiant on the APT1 group
to test their communication patterns. Among 43 backdoor
samples, only 4 exhibit randomized communication patterns
while the remaining ones periodically communicate back to
C&C servers (with small variation between connections).
B. Current Defenses
Large enterprises deploy different security products (anti-
virus, intrusion-detection, firewalls, etc.). Detection and re-
sponse are largely the responsibility of the Security Operations
Center (SOC). The SOC consists of a team of security analysts
that monitors the network activities inside the enterprise net-
work, often relying on commercial blacklists or external intel-
ligence sources (i.e., IOCs) to identify malicious domains and
infected hosts, followed by manual investigation to determine
the scope of the threat. As IOCs are by no means complete,
the investigation phase is particularly labor-intensive. It is this
process that we aim to facilitate in this paper.
Systems to detect botnet communication or malicious do-
mains have been extensively proposed in the literature. Some
of them (e.g., [37], [22]) require malware samples for training.
Unsupervised systems (e.g., [16], [18], [41]) typically require
multiple synchronized hosts compromised by the same mal-
ware, and do not scale to large networks. ExecScent [28]
identifies C&C domains from enterprise web traffic, though
it requires malware samples as input to generate traffic tem-
plates. Our approach is also tailored to large enterprise net-
works like ExecScent, but does not require malware binaries,
and can identify multiple related malicious domains used in
the campaign (not only the C&C stage).
C. Challenges
There were several challenges we had to overcome in
the process of developing our detection methodology. First,
security products deployed within the enterprise perimeter
record large volumes of data daily. For example, the two
datasets we used to evaluate our system are 1.15 TB and 38.14
TB, respectively. To perform efficient analysis, we describe
in §IV-A a suite of techniques that reduce the data volume by
an order of magnitude while retaining the valuable information
about communication of internal hosts to external domains.
In practical situations, we have to deal with different log
formats generated by a variety of deployed security products.
We focus on general patterns of infections that is common
in various types of network data (e.g., NetFlow, DNS logs,
web proxies logs, full packet capture) and demonstrate the
effectiveness of the algorithms on two distinct datasets (DNS
logs in §V and web proxies logs in §VI). In the web proxies log
dataset we enrich the set of features with context information
available in HTTP connections.
Finally, while most existing detection systems focus on
general malware, we aim to also tackle sophisticated infections
which could be part of a targeted attack. APT attacks are
extremely stealthy, maintain low profiles and adapt to the
victim environment, leaving only small amount of evidence
in the log data. We develop an algorithm for identifying
suspicious C&C domains in §IV-C (even when contacted by
a single host) requiring no prior knowledge of the malware
sample. We use these domains as seeds to identify other related
malicious domains and compromised hosts part of the same
campaign through belief propagation. In the case when IOCs
are provided (which is common in enterprise settings), they
can be used as seeds in the same belief propagation algorithm.
Our algorithms are unique in identifying relationships among
domains used in different infection stages, e.g., delivery, C&C.
The evaluation on LANL dataset shows that our approach
is able to detect simulated APT infections and thus has the
potential of detecting targeted attacks in the wild.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide an overview of our approach to
detecting early-stage enterprise infection. Our system analyzes
log data collected at the enterprise border on a regular basis
(e.g., daily), maintains profiles of normal activity within the
enterprise, and detects malware infections by exploiting the
4relationship between suspicious external destinations used in
different infection stages. We first describe the datasets used in
this study, then introduce our main framework based on belief
propagation, the features for detecting suspicious external
destinations, and conclude with an overview of the system
operation. Details on our techniques and features are given in
the next section.
A. Datasets
The first dataset used in this study consists of anonymized
DNS logs collected from the Los Alamos National Lab
(LANL) internal network. It includes DNS queries initiated by
internal hosts, DNS responses from the LANL DNS servers,
timestamps of those events, and IP addresses of the sources
and destination hosts. All of the IP addresses and domain
names are anonymized (consistently — i.e., the same IP
always maps to the same anonymized IP). In addition to real-
world DNS logs, the dataset also includes simulated DNS
traffic that is representative of those observed during the initial
stage of stealthy, targeted attacks (i.e., APTs). A total of 20
distinct attack campaigns are included.
The second dataset AC consists of logs collected by web
proxies that intercept HTTP/HTTPs communications at the
border of a large enterprise network with over 100,000 hosts.
The logs include the connection timestamp, IP addresses of the
source and destination, full URL visited, and additional fields
specific to HTTP communications (HTTP method, status code,
user-agent string, web referer, etc.). As such, the AC dataset
is much richer compared to the LANL dataset.
In addition to the web proxy logs, we also obtained access to
a list of domain IOCs used by the SOC for detecting malicious
activities, and compromised internal hosts communicating to
those domains. The IOCs are gathered from external intelli-
gence sources and commercial blacklists, and often serve as
the initial point of investigation by SOC analysts. This data
was collected at the same time as the web proxies logs.
All of our datasets span an interval of two months (in
early 2013 for LANL, and early 2014 for AC) and are
extremely large (1.15TB and 38.14TB, respectively), raising
a number of scalability challenges. While the AC dataset is
much richer in information, the main advantage of LANL is
that it includes the simulated infection campaigns by LANL
domain experts and thus provides a labeled dataset by which
to validate our methods. Our main results, however, are from
evaluations performed on the AC dataset in collaboration with
the enterprise SOC.
In the analysis and results presented in the following
sections, we focus on “rare” destinations in our datasets.
Our insight is that popular websites (visited by a large user
population) are better administered and less likely to be
compromised, but connections to uncommon destinations may
be indicative of suspicious behavior. More specifically, we are
interested in external destinations that are:
• New: Not visited before by any internal hosts. The
rationale is that attackers tend to use new domains under
their control for at least some of the attack stages, and
also that those malicious domains would not be contacted
by benign hosts.
• Unpopular: Visited by a small number of internal hosts.
The intuition is that attackers are likely to compromise
only a few hosts during initial infection.
To identify the “new” destinations, we keep track of external
destinations contacted by internal hosts over time. This “his-
tory” of destinations is initialized during a bootstraping period
(e.g., one month), and then updated incrementally daily.
These new and unpopular domains are called rare destina-
tions and are the starting point of our detection. We found in
the enterprise of our study that the number of rare destinations
is on the order of 50,000 daily, and the challenge we face is
identifying in this set potential malicious domains.
B. Modes of operation
Our detection method operates in two modes. In the first,
called SOC hints, we use the incidents that the enterprise SOC
investigated as starting points. Given either hosts or domains
confirmed malicious by an analyst as seeds, our algorithm
identifies other related malicious domains (likely part of the
same campaign) and internal compromised hosts that were
unknown previously.
The second is the no-hint mode, in which no known
compromised hosts or malicious domains are available. In
this mode, we develop a new C&C communication detector
utilizing connection timing patterns from hosts to domains,
domain registration information, and enterprise-specific fea-
tures extracted from the web proxy logs. Compared to previous
work, our C&C detector does not require malware samples for
training, and can detect C&C communication when only one
infected host in the enterprise communicates with the external
C&C domain. Interestingly, the detected C&C domains and
the hosts contacting them can be used to seed the same
belief propagation algorithm and identify additional related
suspicious domains and compromised hosts, i.e., serve as input
to the SOC hints mode.
C. Belief propagation framework
We model the communication between internal hosts and
external domains with a bipartite graph G = (V,E), in which
there are two types of vertices, hosts and domains. An edge
is created between a host and a domain if the host contacts
the domain at least once during the observation window (e.g.,
one day). We would like to label each domain as malicious
or benign, and each host as compromised or clean, with high
confidence.
Our main insight is to apply a graph theoretic technique
called belief propagation [31], commonly used to determine
the label of a node given prior knowledge about the node
itself and information about its graph neighbors. The algorithm
is based on iterative message-passing between a node and
its neighbors until convergence or when a specified stopping
condition is met. For our purposes, the messages (or “beliefs”)
passed between nodes are an indication of suspicious activities
observed during early-stage malware infections. In typical im-
plementations, the entire graph is constructed in advance and
“beliefs” are transmitted from every node to all its neighbors
in each iteration. Since the graphs in our case are very large
5(potentially tens of thousands of domains and hosts daily), we
propose an incremental method of building the bipartite graph
in which hosts and domains are added to the graph only when
the confidence of their compromise is high.
We build a graph starting from the known compromised
hosts (and optionally suspicious domains) given as seeds. In
each iteration, we compute scores for those rare domains
contacted by known compromised hosts, and label the domains
with the highest scores as suspicious. The set of compromised
hosts is also expanded to include other hosts contacting the
newly labeled suspicious domains. The algorithm terminates
when the score of the top-ranking domain is below a thresh-
old, or when the maximum number of iterations is reached,
and returns a list of labeled malicious domains ordered by
suspiciousness level.
The score for a domain is computed based on 1) the degree
to which the domain exhibits C&C-like behavior (described
in §III-D), or 2) its similarity to labeled suspicious domains
from previous iterations of the belief propagation. In the
latter case, the similarity of two domains is based on the
overlap in hosts that contacted them, time difference between
connections by the same host, and proximity of their IP
addresses. These features, combined with properties of the
domain itself (domain age, registration validity, popularity of
user-agent string and web referer information), are used in a
regression model to compute a similarity score for the domain
relative to the set of domains already labeled suspicious during
belief propagation. More details about domain similarity is
provided in §IV-D.
D. Detecting C&C communication
As discussed in §II communication to the C&C center
happens in many campaigns on a regular basis to allow the
attacker backdoor access into the compromised system. Such
communications are automatically generated by a malicious
process on the victim’s machine, and exhibit certain regular-
ity in connection timing patterns. By contrast, normal user
activities are largely variable.
We leverage these insights to build a novel detector for
automated communication that compares the inter-connection
histogram of the communication between a host and a domain
to that of a periodic (regular) distribution. The communication
between a host and a domain is labeled “automated” if the
statistical distance between the two histograms is below a
certain threshold. Compared to other methods for identify-
ing automated connections (e.g., Fast-Fourier transform in
BotFinder [37] and autocorrelation in BotSniffer [18]) our
method can be tuned for resiliency to outliers and random-
ization between connections through several parameters. Our
detector (like previously proposed timing-based C&C detec-
tion methods) will miss communications with large variability
in timing patterns, but these methods are not commonly
used by attackers [26]. Detecting C&C communication with
completely randomized timing patterns (without access to
known malware samples) remains an open problem to the
community.
However, thousands of legitimate requests have regular
timing patterns as well (due to site refreshes or automatic
updates). Restricting our focus to rare domains significantly
reduces the number of considered domains, but we need to
leverage additional features to identify the truly suspicious au-
tomated connections. Some of these features have been used in
previous work for identifying generic malicious activities (e.g.,
domain age and registration validity extracted from WHOIS
data), and some are tailored to an enterprise environment (e.g.,
popularity of user-agent strings within that network and web
referer information in the HTTP traffic).
Combining these features, we train a linear regression model
to output a score for each domain that is detected to receive
automated, periodic, communications. More specifically, the
score for a domain is a weighted sum of the features, where
the weights are determined by the regression model during
training. Domains with score higher than a threshold (deter-
mined based on tradeoffs between accuracy and coverage) are
considered potential C&C domains.
E. Putting it all together
Our system for detecting early-stage enterprise infection
consists of two main phases: training (during a one-month
bootstrapping period) and operation (daily after the training
period). An overview diagram is presented in Figure 1.
Training. The training period is specific to each organization
and its role is to create a benchmark of normal activity of
enterprise hosts. It consists of several steps.
(1) Data normalization and reduction: The first stage pro-
cesses the raw log data (either HTTP or DNS logs) used for
training and applies normalization and reduction techniques.
(2) Profiling: Starting from normalized data, the system pro-
files the activity of internal hosts. It builds histories of external
destinations visited by internal hosts as well as user-agent
(UA) strings used in HTTP requests (when available). These
histories are maintained and incrementally updated during the
operation stage when new data is available.
(3) Customizing the C&C detector: The detector of C&C
communication is customized to the characteristics of the
enterprise. Enterprise-specific features (e.g., rare destinations,
popularity of user-agent strings used in a connection, web
referer information) are used in combination with other generic
features utilized in previous work (automated connections,
domain age and validity). A regression model is trained to
determine the feature weights for the particular enterprise and
the threshold above which a domain is flagged as C&C.
(4) Customizing the domain similarity score: The domain sim-
ilarity score used during belief propagation is also customized
to the enterprise during the training phase. The weights of the
features used for determining domain similarity scores during
belief propagation, as well as the score threshold, are also
chosen by a regression model.
Operation. After the initial training period, the system enters
into daily operation mode. Several stages are performed daily:
(1) Data normalization and reduction: The system processes
new data for that day, normalizes it and performs data reduc-
tion.
(2) Profile comparison and update: New data is compared with
historical profiles, and rare destinations, as well as rare UAs
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Fig. 1: Overview of training and operation stages in our system for detecting enterprise infection. Training stage is on the left
and operation on the right. Input data is shown in red, processing steps in blue and various outputs in black.
(used by a small number of hosts) are identified. Histories of
external destinations and UAs are updated with new data, so
that changes in normal behavior are captured in the profiles.
(3) C&C detector: The C&C detector is run daily, and scores
of automated domains are computed with weights determined
during training. Automated domains with scores above a
threshold are labeled as potential C&C domains.
(4) Belief propagation: The belief propagation algorithm is
run in two modes (with or without hints). The output is an
ordered list of suspicious domains presented to SOC for further
investigation.
IV. SYSTEM DETAILS
After providing an overview of our system for detecting
early-stage enterprise infection, we give here more technical
details of our methods.
A. Data Normalization and Reduction
LANL dataset. LANL released a dataset comprised of
anonymized DNS traffic collected over two months (February
and March 2013) from their internal network [15]. The entire
LANL dataset consists of 3.81 billion DNS queries and 3.89
billion DNS responses, amounting to 1.15 TB. To allow
efficient analysis, we employ a number of data reduction
techniques. We first restrict our analysis only to A records, as
they record the queries to domain names and their responses
(IP addresses) and information in other records (e.g., TXT)
is redacted and thus not useful. This step prunes 30.4% of
DNS records on average per day. We also filter out queries
for internal LANL resources (as our focus is on detecting
suspicious external communications), and queries initiated
by internal servers (since we aim at detecting compromised
hosts).
AC dataset. The AC dataset consists of web proxies logs
generated at the border of a large enterprise over a period
of two months (January and February 2014). Analyzing the
AC dataset proved difficult due to its large scale, as well
as inconsistent information. There are on average 662GB of
log data generated daily, resulting in a total of 38.14TB of
data over the two months of our investigation. This dataset
is 33 times larger than the LANL dataset, and much richer in
information. Compared to LANL data in which all timestamps
are in the same time zone and IP addresses are statically
assigned, the AC dataset has some inconsistencies due to
multiple time zones (as the collection devices are in different
geographical locations) and DHCP and VPN assignment for
most of the IP address space.
We omit here a detailed description of our normalization
procedure, but we converted all timestamps into UTC and
DHCP and VPN IP addresses to hostnames (by parsing the
DHCP and VPN logs collected by the organization). After
normalization, we extract the timestamp, hostname, destination
domain, destination IP, user-agent string, web referrer and
HTTP status code fields for our analysis. We do not consider
destinations that are IP addresses.
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Fig. 2: The number of domains encountered daily in LANL
after data reduction for the first week of March.
Rare destinations. For both datasets, we use the first month of
data for profiling and building a history of external destinations
visited by internal hosts. We determine for each day of the
second month a list of new destinations not visited before by
any internal host. The rationale is that attackers tend to use new
domains under their control not visited previously by internal
hosts, and benign hosts (the large majority) are unlikely to
visit malicious sites contacted by compromised hosts.
7For profiling external destinations, we first “fold” the do-
main names to second-level (e.g., news.nbc.com is folded
to nbc.com), assuming that this captures the entity or or-
ganization responsible for the domain. Since domain names
are anonymized in the LANL dataset, we conservatively fold
to third-level domains (as we don’t have information on top-
level domains). We then maintain a history of (folded) external
destinations queried by internal hosts, updated at the end of
each day to include all new domains from that day. A domain
is considered to be new on a particular day if it has not been
contacted before, and unpopular is it has been queried by less
than a certain threshold of distinct hosts in a single day. We
set the threshold at 10 hosts based on discussion with security
professionals at a large organization. These rare destinations
are the starting point for our investigation.
Following the steps detailed above, we greatly reduce the
size of both datasets. The number of domains after each
reduction step in LANL for one week in March is shown in
Figure 2. On average, while the full dataset contains queries
from almost 80,000 hosts to more than 400,000 domains per
day, in the reduced dataset only 3,369 hosts querying 31,582
domains are included daily on average. In the AC dataset
starting from 120K hosts and 600K domains in the original
dataset, after data reduction we encounter on average 20K
hosts and 59K rare domains daily.
B. Belief Propagation Algorithm
The belief propagation algorithm can be applied in two
modes: with hints of compromised hosts provided by SOC,
or without hints. In the first case we use as seed a list of
compromised hosts investigated and confirmed by security
analysts in SOC and optionally a list of malicious domains. In
the latter case the C&C communication detector is run first to
identify a set of potential C&C domains and hosts contacting
them. These are given as seeds to the belief propagation
algorithm. The algorithm is run daily in both modes and it
detects malicious domains and compromised hosts that are
likely part of the same campaign with the provided seeds.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode of the belief propa-
gation algorithm. The algorithm is initialized with the set of
compromised hosts H, and set of malicious domains M (when
available). In the SOC hints case, H is the set of hint hosts
and M is the set of malicious domains (if provided). In the
no-hint case, M is the set of potential C&C domains and H
is the set of hosts contacting them.
The algorithm maintains several variables: R the set of
rare domains contacted by hosts in H and N the set of
newly labeled malicious domains (in a particular iteration).
In each iteration, the algorithm first detects suspicious C&C-
like domains among set R using function Detect C&C whose
exact implementation will be provided next section. Note
that in the no-hint mode function Detect C&C will not
identify additional C&C domains (since they are used for
seeding the algorithm and are already included in M). If no
suspicious C&C domains are found, the algorithm computes
a similarity score for all rare domains in R with function
Compute SimScore. The domain of maximum score (if
above a certain threshold Ts) is included in set M. Finally
the set of compromised hosts is expanded to include other
hosts contacting the newly labeled malicious domain(s). The
algorithm iterates until the stoping condition is met: either
no new domains are labeled as malicious (due to their scores
being below the threshold) or the maximum number of iter-
ations has been reached. The output is an expanded lists of
compromised hosts H and malicious domains M.
Algorithm 1 [Belief Propagation]
/* H ← set of seed hosts */
/* M← set of seed domains */
/* dom host is a mapping from a domain to set of hosts contacting it */
/* host rdom is a mapping from a host to set of rare domains visited */
function BELIEF PROPAGATION(H,M):
R ← set of rare domains contacted by hosts in H
while stop condition do
N ← Φ /* set of newly labeled malicious domains */
for dom in R \M do
if Detect C&C(dom) then
N ← N ∪ {dom}
R ← R \ {dom}
if N = Φ then
for dom in R \M do
score[dom] ← Compute SimScore(dom)
max score ← max[score[dom]]
max dom ← dom of maximum score
if max score ≥ Ts then
N ← N ∪ {dom}
if N 6= Φ then
M←M∪N
H ← H∪ (∪d∈N dom host[d])
R ← R ∪ (∪h∈H host rdom[h])
C. Detection of C&C communication
Dynamic histograms. We aim at detecting automated con-
nections with fairly regular timing patters, but be resilient to
outliers (for instance large gaps in communication) and small
amounts of randomization introduced by attackers between
connections.
Initially, we tested a detector for automated connections
based on standard deviation (labeling the connections between
a host and a domain as automated if the standard deviation of
the inter-connection intervals is small), but found out that a
single outlier could result in high standard deviation. Our main
idea is to generate a histogram of inter-connection intervals be-
tween a host and a domain, and compare it to that of a periodic
distribution using a known statistical distance. However, the
distance metric is highly sensitive to the histogram bin size
and alignment. Setting the size to a large value leads to over
smoothing, while a small value increases the sampling error.
When bins are statically defined, relatively close values might
fall under different bins, affecting the distance metric.
We propose a dynamic histogram binning method instead.
Here we first cluster the inter-connection intervals (denoted
t1, . . . , tm) of successive connections from a host to a domain
on a particular day, and then define the bins dynamically
from the generated clusters. Let the first interval t1 be the
first cluster “hub.” An interval ti is considered as part of a
cluster if it is within W of the cluster hub. Otherwise, a new
cluster with hub ti is created. W is a fixed value, and acts as
our “bin width.” This dynamic binning method allows us to
8accommodate timing randomizations typically introduced by
attackers between connections.
Each resulting cluster is considered a bin, its frequency
is computed and the resulting histogram is compared to that
of the periodic distribution with period equal to the highest-
frequency cluster hub. We label the communications between
a host and a domain to be automated if their inter-connection
histogram is “close” to periodic (i.e., within a threshold JT ),
as determined by the Jeffrey divergence. For two histograms
H = [(bi, hi)] and K = [(bi, ki)], if mi = (hi + ki)/2 the
Jeffrey divergence is defined as [35]:
dJ(H,K) =
∑
i
(hi log
hi
mi
+ ki log
ki
mi
)
We choose the Jeffrey divergence metric motivated by the
fact that it is “numerically stable and robust to noise and size
of histogram bins” [35]. We experimented with other statistical
metrics (e.g., L1 distance), but the results were very similar
and omit them herein. The bin width W and distance threshold
JT parameters control the resiliency of the method to outliers
and randomization introduced by attackers. We discuss their
selection according to the LANL dataset in §V-B.
Additional features. For each rare automated domain visited
by an internal host we extract six additional features which
will be used for the C&C detector:
Domain connectivity features: We consider the number of
hosts contacting the domain (NoHosts) called domain con-
nectivity and the number of hosts with automated connections
to the domain (AutoHosts). The intuition here is that most
rare domains (legitimate ones) are contacted by only one host,
but those rare domains contacted by multiple hosts are more
suspicious as they might indicate multiple compromised hosts
under attacker’s control.
Web connection features: Based on discussions with security
professional at a large organization, web connections with no
web referrer information are more suspicious, as they are not
part of a user browsing session and might be generated by a
process running on the user machine. Typical user browsing
sessions include web referer information, but in some cases the
web-referer is wiped out (e.g., java script or iframes embedded
in web pages). To capture this, we include a feature NoRef
denoting the fraction of hosts (among all hosts contacting that
domain) that use no web referer.
Additionally, most users have a fairly small number of
user-agent strings in their HTTP connections (on average
between 7 and 9 per user). Software configurations in an
enterprise are more homogenous than in other networks (e.g.,
university campus), and as such we’d expect that most user-
agent strings are employed by a large population of users. With
this intuition, the rare user-agent strings, those used by a small
number of hosts, might indicate unpopular software installed
on the user machine which can potentially be associated with
suspicious activities. We consider a feature RareUA denoting
the fraction of hosts that use no UA or a rare UA when
contacting the domain.
To determine the popularity of UA strings, we maintain a
history of UAs encountered across time and the hosts using
those UAs. The UA history is built during the training phase
for a period of one month and then updated daily based on
new ingested data. An UA is considered rare (after the training
period of one month) if it is used by less than a threshold of
hosts (set at 10 based on SOC recommendation).
Registration data features: Attacker-controlled sites tend
to use more recently registered domains than legitimate
ones [25]. In addition, attackers register their domains for
shorter periods of time to minimize their costs in case the
campaign is detected and taken down. We query WHOIS
information and extract two features: DomAge (number of days
since the domain was registered), and DomValidity (number of
days until the registration expires).
Scoring automated domains. During the training stage, for
each rare domain identified as having automated connec-
tions, we extract the six features explained above. We also
query VirusTotal for each rare automated domain and label
it “reported” if at least one anti-virus engine reports it and
“legitimate” otherwise. Using the set of automated domains
visited in the enterprise for two weeks, we train a linear
regression model, implemented using the function lm in the
R package. The regression model outputs a weight for each
feature, as well as the significance of that feature. The final
score for each automated domain is a linear combination of
feature values weighted by regression coefficients. Finally,
based on the model, we select a score threshold Tc above
which domains are labeled as potential C&C domains. We
provide results on the regression model and threshold selection
in Section VI-A.
During the operation stage, domain scores are computed
using the weights of the regression model (built during train-
ing). Function Detect C&C in Algorithm 1 returns true for a
domain if automated connections are detected to the domain
(from at least one host) and the domain score is above the
threshold Tc computed during training.
D. Domain similarity
We consider a number of features when computing similar-
ity of a domain D with a set of domains S labeled malicious
in previous iterations of belief propagation.
Domain connectivity. First is the domain connectivity as
defined above.
Timing correlations. Second, we consider features related to
the time when the domain D was visited by internal hosts.
During initial infection stage of a campaign, we suspect that a
host visits several domains under the attacker’s control within
a relatively short time period (as explained in §II). We thus
consider the minimum timing difference between a host visit
to domain D and other malicious domains in set S. The shorter
this interval, the more suspicious D is.
IP space proximity. Third, we consider proximity in IP space
between D and malicious domains in set S, i.e., if they are
in the same IP/16 or IP/24. The intuition here is that attackers
host a large number of malicious domains under a small
number of IP subnets (i.e., IP/24 or IP/16 subnets) [19], [26].
We provide measurement of the timing and IP proximity
features on the LANL dataset in §V-B. In addition, when
9Case Description Dates Hint Hosts
1 From one hint host detect the 3/2, 3/3, 3/4, One per day
contacted malicious domains. 3/9, 3/10
2 From a set of hint hosts detect 3/5, 3/6, 3/7, 3/8, Three or four
the contacted malicious domains. 3/11, 3/12, 3/13 per day
3 From one hint host detect the 3/14, 3/15, 3/17, One per day
contacted malicious domains and 3/18, 3/19, 3/20,
other compromised hosts. 3/21
4 Detect malicious domains and 3/22 No hints
compromised hosts without hint.
TABLE I: The four cases in LANL challenge problem.
computing domain scores in belief propagation some of
the features introduced for scoring C&C domains (NoRef,
RareUA, DomAge, DomValidity) are also used, as they might
indicate suspicious activities.
During the training stage we build a linear regression model
with eight features in total, using a set of (non-automated) rare
domains visited over two weeks. Results and threshold selec-
tion are provided in Section VI-A. During the operation stage,
function Compute SimScore in Algorithm 1 computes a
domain similarity score by using the feature weights found
by this model relative to the set of already labeled malicious
domains in previous iterations.
V. EVALUATION ON THE LANL DATASET
We start by describing the four cases in the LANL challenge
problem. Then we discuss how we adapted our techniques de-
veloped for enterprise infection to detecting the LANL attacks
(when less information is available about domain names and
connection information). Still, using less features, we are able
to demonstrate that our belief propagation framework achieves
excellent results on the LANL challenge problem.
A. The LANL Challenge Problem
The LANL dataset includes attack traces from 20 indepen-
dent infection campaigns simulated by LANL domain experts.
Each simulation is an instance of the initial first-day infection
stage of an independent campaign. LANL issued the APT
Infection Discovery Challenge to the community requesting
novel methods for the detection of malicious domains and
compromised hosts involved in these attack instances [15].
More specifically, each of the simulated attacks belongs to
one of four cases in increasing order of difficulty, described
in Table I. Cases 1-3 include “hints” about the identity of one
or multiple compromised hosts, while no hint is available for
case 4. Answers (i.e., the malicious domains) are also given
for each attack for validation.
B. Parameter selection
When selecting various parameters for our algorithms, we
separate the 20 simulated attacks into two equal-size sets,
and use one for training (attacks from 3/2, 3/3, 3/4, 3/5,
3/7, 3/12, 3/14, 3/15, 3/17, and 3/18), and the other for
testing. We try to include attacks from each case in both
training and testing sets, with the only exception of case 4,
simulated only on one day (3/22). We deliberately add this
most challenging attack (in which no hint is provided) to the
testing set. We use the training set for selecting parameters
needed for different components of the algorithm (dynamic
histogram method, C&C communication detection, features
used for domain scoring, etc.). We show that parameters
chosen according to the training set perform well on new data
(testing set).
Bin width Jeffrey distance Malicious Malicious All automated
W threshold pairs in pairs in pairs in
JT training testing testing days
5 seconds 0.0 12 15 7495
0.034 14 15 8070
0.06 15 17 8579
0.35 15 18 34719
10 seconds 0.0 12 16 15611
0.034 14 16 16224
0.06 15 18 16803
20 seconds 0.0 12 15 23352
0.034 14 16 23964
0.06 15 18 24597
TABLE II: Number of automated malicious (host, domain)
pairs in training and testing sets, as well as the number of
automated pairs for all days in testing set.
Thresholds for dynamic histograms. The dynamic histogram
method compares the histogram of inter-connection intervals
from successive connections by a host to a domain on a
particular day to that of a periodic distribution with the
goal of identifying automated communications. As described
in §IV-C the method can be configured with two parameters:
bin width (W ) denoting the maximum distance between the
bin hub and other intervals in the same bin, and the threshold
(JT ) denoting the maximum Jeffrey distance between the
two histograms. A connection with histogram at distance less
than JT from the periodic histogram is considered automated.
Intuitively, the larger W and JT , the more resilience the
method provides against randomization and outliers, but more
legitimate connections are labeled automated as well.
To determine the most suitable parameterization, we exper-
iment with 3 different bin widths (5, 10 and 20 seconds) and
choose the distance threshold JT according to the training set
of malicious automated connections. We manually labeled as
automated 15 (host, domain) pairs in training set and 18 pairs
in testing set corresponding to 18 distinct domains. Table II
shows the number of malicious (host, domain) pairs labeled
automated (in both training and testing sets), as well as all
pairs labeled automated in the testing days for several choices
of W and JT . Intuitively, fixing one of the parameters W or
JT and increasing the other results in more legitimate domains
labeled automated.
For our purposes, we aim at capturing all malicious pairs in
the training and testing sets, while labeling fewest legitimate
connections automated. For the 10 and 20-second bin width,
the threshold capturing all 33 malicious pairs is 0.06, while
for the 5-second bin width we need to increase the threshold
at 0.35. This larger threshold has the effect of increasing the
number of legitimate pairs labeled automated. Based on these
results, we choose a bin size of 10 seconds and a threshold
distance of 0.06 to achieve our desired properties.
Features. Since domain names in the LANL dataset are
anonymized and the data contains only DNS requests, we have
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Fig. 3: The CDFs between first connection to two malicious
domains and a malicious and legitimate domain by a host.
access to a smaller number of features than in the enterprise
case. Features related to domain registration (domain age
and registration validity), and features extracted from HTTP
connections are not available in LANL.
For detecting C&C communication, there are thousands of
automated domains daily (up to 5239). Restricting to rare
domains is beneficial in reducing the number of automated
domains by a factor of more than 100, but we still observe
hundreds of rare automated domains. To identify C&C com-
munications among this set, we combine multiple features that
are available in this dataset, in particular domain connectivity
and similarity in timing patterns across hosts. The C&C
detector for LANL is very simple: we consider an automated
domain as potential C&C if there are at least two distinct hosts
communicating with the domain at similar time periods (within
10 seconds). This heuristic works well because in the LANL
simulations there are always multiple infected hosts in every
campaign. However, in our most general C&C detector for the
enterprise case, we consider domain connectivity as a feature
which can be combined with other features extracted from
registration data and HTTP connection. Our general method
can detect C&C domains contacted by a single host.
Using the LANL simulated attacks, we’d like to measure
the relevance of the timing and IP space similarity features
among malicious domains. For compromised hosts in the
training set, we extract the timestamp of their first connection
to every rare domain visited. We plot in Figure 3 CDFs of the
distributions of the time difference between visits to malicious
domains and a legitimate and malicious domain by the same
host. The graph confirms that connection intervals between
two malicious domains are much shorter than between a
malicious and a legitimate domain. For example, 56% of
visits to two malicious domains happen at intervals smaller
than 160 seconds, while only 3.8% of malicious-to-legitimate
connection intervals are below this threshold (similar results
are observed on testing dataset).
Next we measure similarity in IP space for malicious
Hosts Domains
74.92.144.170
252.90.88.2
rainbow-.c3
fluttershy.c3
74.92.144.27
74.92.144.31
pinkiepie.c3
Hint 1
1
0.82
2
2
3 0.42
74.92.144.137
74.92.144.186
3
3
applejack.c3 4 0.28
191.146.166.145
191.146.166.31
93.31.34.158
191.146.224.111
Scores
C&C Comm. at
10-minute interval
Fig. 4: Application of belief propagation to the 3/19 campaign.
and legitimate domains in the training set. We found that 7
malicious domain pairs are in the same IP/24 subnet, while 18
share an IP/16 subnet. We observed few cases of legitimate
domains residing in the same subnet with malicious ones. With
the exception of 3/7, when more than 2000 pairs of malicious
and legitimate domains share the same IP24 or IP16 subnet
(due to a single malicious domain belonging to a popular
service), the rest of days we observe 20 pairs in the same
IP24 subnet and 155 pairs in the same IP16 subnet. We thus
use both IP/16 and IP/24 space features in detection but with
different weights.
Domain similarity scores. In a particular iteration of belief
propagation a domain D is compared to the set of domains S
already labeled malicious in previous iterations. The domain
score is computed as a function of three components: domain
connectivity, timing correlation with a known malicious do-
main in S (value 1 if the domain is contacted close in time
to a malicious domain and 0 otherwise), proximity in the IP
space with malicious domains in M (value 2 if same /24
subnet with a malicious domain, 1 if same /16 subnet with a
malicious domain and 0 otherwise). Each of these components
increases the domain’s score. While in our general framework,
we proposed a linear regression model for computing domain
scores (see §IV-C and §IV-D), we cannot apply that technique
here due to limited samples of training data. Instead, we
choose a simple additive function that computes the score as
the sum of the three components above and then normalizes
it. This performs well in both cases 3 and 4 (based on the
training set we set the domain score threshold Ts at 0.25).
C. Results
We omit here description of the first two cases due to space
limitations.
Starting from a hint host (case 3). We ran the belief
propagation algorithm for a maximum of five iterations starting
from the provided hint host, but we stop the algorithm if the
maximum domain score is below the threshold Ts.
An example of applying the algorithm to detecting the
campaign on 3/19 in the LANL dataset is given in Figure 4.
Starting from hint host 74.92.144.170, in the first iteration
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C&C communication to domain rainbow-.c3 is detected at
10-minute average intervals. The domain is labeled malicious
and the second host (252.90.88.2) compromised. In the follow-
ing three iterations, three rare domains of maximum score are
labeled malicious based on similarity with previously labeled
malicious domains (their scores are given on the right). The
algorithm stops at the fifth iteration when the maximum score
is below a threshold, at which point all labeled domains are
confirmed malicious.
The algorithm detects all 12 labeled malicious domains
in training days (with no false positives) and all 12 labeled
malicious domains in testing days at the cost of one false
positive for 3/21.
No hints (case 4). In the most challenging case no hint on
compromised hosts are available to seed the belief propagation
algorithm. We thus identify first C&C communication and
seed the belief propagation algorithm with the C&C domains.
Interestingly, the same algorithm from case 3 delivered very
good results on case 4, where we did not have an opportunity
for training (case 4 was simulated only on a single day). The
five domains identified by belief propagation were confirmed
malicious (by the simulation answer), and the algorithm did
not have any false positives.
Summary. The summary of our results on the four cases of
the LANL challenge are given in Table III. We define several
metrics of interest: true detection rate (TDR) is the fraction of
true positives and false detection rate (FDR) is the fraction of
false positives among all detected domains; and false negative
rate (FNR) is the fraction of malicious domains labeled as
legitimate by our detector. Overall, we achieve TDR of 98.33%
(97.06% on the testing set), with FDR of 1.67% (2.94% on
testing set) and FNR of 6.35% (2.94% on the testing set).
Case True Positives False Positives False Negatives
Training Testing Training Testing Training Testing
Case 1 6 4 0 0 2 0
Case 2 8 12 0 0 1 1
Case 3 12 12 0 1 0 0
Case 4 - 5 - 0 - 0
Total 26 33 0 1 3 1
TABLE III: Results on LANL challenge.
VI. EVALUATION ON ENTERPRISE DATA
We implemented a fully operational system running in
production starting from January 1 2014 to process the web
proxies logs from the AC dataset. We use the data collected
in January for training various components of the system
(e.g., the C&C detector, the domain scoring module, etc.) and
profiling external destinations and user-agent strings used by
enterprise hosts in HTTP communication. Starting from Febru-
ary 1 the system enters into the daily operation mode, in which
it processes new web proxies logs, applies normalization and
reduction techniques, compares the data with the profiles
(which are also updated) and applies our detection techniques.
First C&C communication is identified, and domains labeled
as C&C are given as seeds to belief propagation. Second,
domains confirmed by SOC (if available) and hosts contacting
them are provided as seeds in belief propagation. The detection
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Fig. 5: CDFs of automated reported/legitimate domain scores.
results are thoroughly validated through a combinations of
tools and manual analysis. The system is configurable with
different parameters (e.g., scoring thresholds, number of it-
erations in belief propagation, etc.) according to the SOC’s
processing capacity. We present the parameter selection, our
validation methodology and the results in both modes of
operation.
A. Parameter selection
Scoring automated domains. The parameters of the dynamic
histogram method selected in §V-B result in 841 distinct
automated domains for the month of February in the AC
dataset. We query VirusTotal for each rare automated domain
and label it “reported” if at least one anti-virus engine reports
it and “legitimate” otherwise (144 domains were reported by
VirusTotal). We thus generate a large set of labeled automated
domains and use it to learn the relevance of each feature in
identifying suspicious C&C domains.
In total, we observe 2888 automated (host, domain) pairs in
the month of February for which we can extract all features
described in §IV-C. We divide the labeled set of automated
domains into a training set covering the first two weeks of
February, and testing set for the last two weeks. We construct
a linear regression model on the training set, which outputs
a coefficient for each feature, as well as the significance of
that feature. Among all features considered, the only one
with low significance was AutoHosts, which we believe is
highly correlated with NoHosts and thus omit it. The most
relevant features found by the model are DomAge and RareUA.
DomAge is the only one negatively correlated with reported
domains (as they are in general more recently registered than
legitimate ones), but all other features are positively correlated.
The graph in Figure 5 shows the difference between the
scores of automated domains reported by VirusTotal and
legitimate ones on the training set. We observe that reported
domains have higher scores than legitimate ones. For instance,
selecting a threshold of 0.4 for labeling an automated domain
suspicious results in 57.18% true detection rate and 10.59%
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false positive rate on the training set, and 54.95% true de-
tection rate and 11.52% false positives on the testing set. We
emphasize that our final goal is not identifying all automated
domains reported by VirusTotal, but rather a significant frac-
tion that allow us to bootstrap the belief propagation algorithm
and find new suspicious domains not yet detected by current
anti-virus technologies.
Domain similarity. To obtain a list of (non-automated) rare
domains and their features, we start from a set of compro-
mised hosts (those contacting the C&C domains confirmed by
VirusTotal). We include each rare domain contacted by at least
one host in this set, extract its features, query VirusTotal to get
an indication of its status, and divide the data into training and
testing set, covering the first and last two weeks of February,
respectively.
We apply again linear regression on the training set to
determine feature weights and significance. Among the eight
considered features described in §IV-D, the only one with low
significance was IP16, as we believe it’s highly correlated
with IP24. The most relevant features identified by the model
are RareUA, DomInterval, IP24 and DomAge. We still observe
a difference in the score CDFs for reported and legitimate
domains (we omit the plot due to space limitations).
B. Validation methodology
We ran the detector in both modes, SOC hints and no-hints.
In the SOC hints mode we use domains from the IOC list
provided by SOC as seeds. The domains output by our detector
in both modes (not considering the seeds provided by SOC)
were validated as follows. We first query VirusTotal and the
IOC domain list to verify their status (three months after they
were detected – to allow anti-virus and blacklists to catch up).
If the domain is alerted upon by at least one scanner used by
VirusTotal or it’s an IOC we consider it known malicious.
For other domains, we collect additional information and
hand them to a security analyst for manual investigation.
Specifically, we retrieve the associated URLs from the log
data and crawl them to examine the responses. The URLs
are also manually submitted to McAfee SiteAdvisor. Based
on the URLs, the response to our crawler and the result
from SiteAdvisor, we classify the remaining domains into four
categories: new malicious (e.g., same URL patterns as known
malicious domains, returning malicious content or flagged
by SiteAdvisor), suspicious (not resolvable when crawled,
parked or having some questionable activities), legitimate (no
suspicious behavior or code observed) and unknown (504
HTTP response code, a sign of server error). Since we only
have a few unknowns (6 in total), we remove them from the
final results. When reporting our results we use several metrics
of interest: TDR and FDR defined in §V-C, and new-discovery
rate (NDR) defined as the percentage of new malicious and
suspicious domains detected. Here TDR is the percentage of
both known and new malicious and suspicious domains among
all detected domains, and FDR = 1 - TDR.
C. Results for the no-hint case
We first evaluate the effectiveness of our detector in the
no-hints mode. We compute scores for all automated domains
encountered daily. For domains whose WHOIS information
can not be parsed default values for DomAge and DomValidity
are set at average values across all automated domains. As
the first step, we vary the threshold for labeling automated
connections from 0.4 to 0.48 and present results for domains
detected as C&C domains (with score above the threshold)
in Figure 6(a). The results demonstrate that as we increase
the threshold on automated domain scores from 0.4 to 0.48
the number of domains labeled as C&C drops from 114 to
19, while accuracy increases (TDR increases from 85.08%
to 94.7%). Though FDR is higher for threshold 0.4, more
malicious domains (including 23 new ones not known to
VirusTotal or SOC) are detected. They can be used to seed the
belief propagation stage, and therefore we fix the threshold at
0.4 to evaluate the overall effectiveness of belief propagation
in this mode.
Next, we vary the threshold for domain scoring in belief
propagation from 0.33 to 0.85 and the result (Figure 6(b))
shows that the number of all detected domains varies from 265
to 114, with TDR ranging from 76.2% to 85.1%. Altogether
in the most challenging case (when no hint is available), we
detect 202 malicious and suspicious domains in February,
associated with 945 hosts. Though the majority of the detected
domains are already alarmed by SOC and VirusTotal (132
for threshold 0.33), only 13 are reported in the IOC list
and the remaining ones are unknown to the enterprise. More
interestingly, we identified many new malicious and suspicious
domains not known to the community (a total of 70 new
domains for threshold 0.33 resulting in an NDR of 26.4%).
This result suggests that our detector could greatly comple-
ment existing security tools by discovering new suspicious
activities. Its main advantage is that it has the ability to detect
new campaigns without traces of known malicious behavior.
We thoroughly examined the domains labeled as new ma-
licious and suspicious and found several prominent and inter-
esting clusters. Among the new malicious domains, we found
5 domains hosting URLs with the same pattern /logo.gif?
later confirmed by the SOC as related to Sality worm. We
also found 15 domains with the same URL pattern reported
by VirusTotal. Moreover, we identified a cluster of 10 DGA
domains with none of them reported by VirusTotal and SOC,
demonstrating our detector’s ability in capturing new mali-
cious campaigns. All the malicious domains are under the
TLD .info and their names have 4 or 5 characters (e.g.,
mgwg.info). 9 out of the 10 domains hosts URLs with
pattern /tan2.html and visiting them will be redirected to
the remaining domain 1.tv990.info.
We labeled legitimate a set of 63 domains belonging to
categories like Ad-network, Gaming, Toolbar and Torrent
Tracker. They are captured by our detector because they
exhibit suspicious features, like automated connections or are
registered recently. Though they do not pose serious harm
to the enterprise, some of them are policy violations (e.g.,
Gaming, Torrent Tracker). We labeled them legitimate since
we did not discover any suspicious activities, but we believe
these domains still need to be vetted.
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Fig. 6: Statistics on detected domains. (a) C&C communication. (b) No hints. (c) SOC hints.
D. Results for the SOC hints case
We also present results in Figure 6(c) for the belief prop-
agation algorithm in SOC hints mode seeded with 28 IOC
domains. We do not include the seed domains in the results.
We set the domain score threshold at 0.4 for automated
domains and vary the similarity score between 0.33 and 0.45.
In total, we detect between 137 domains (at threshold 0.33) to
73 domains (at threshold 0.45), with TDR ranging from 78.8%
to 94.6%. Among the 137 detected domains, 108 turn out to
be malicious (either known or new) and suspicious, which is
about four times larger than the set used for seeding.
Among the 108 malicious and suspicious domains, 79
domains are confirmed by SOC or VirusTotal, leaving 29
domains as our new findings. We inspect the new findings
and identify an interesting group of domains generated through
DGA. This group consists of 10 domains under TLD .info
and the name for each domain has 20 characters (e.g.,
f0371288e0a20a541328.info). Surprisingly, the registra-
tion dates for most of the domains are later than the time
when we detected them. For example, one domain is detected
on 2014/02/13 but registered on 2014/02/18. Attackers use
DGA domains to increase the robustness of their C&C centers
against take-downs, and they only register a portion of the
domains to reduce the cost. Our detector is able to detect
the malicious domains before registeration and obtain an
advantage in the arm-race.
Finally, we compare the results of the two modes of
operation. Only 21 domains are detected in both modes, which
is a small portion compared to 202 and 108 malicious and
suspicious domains detected separately. When deployed by
the enterprise, we suggest our detector configured to run in
both modes, in order to have better coverage. We present two
case studies for both modes of operation in the Appendix.
As we have shown, starting from a seed of known malicious
domains or hosts, the algorithm in SOC hints mode can
identify suspicious domains with high accuracy. The no-hint
case has the unique capability of identifying new unknown
attack campaigns, especially C&C communications of these
campaigns (even when only a single host is compromised).
We recommend that C&C detected domains are first vetted by
the SOC and then the algorithm can be used in the SOC hints
mode for those confirmed malicious domains.
Both variants include configurable thresholds for scoring
automated and non-automated domains. These thresholds can
be chosen by the SOC according to the capacity of the
team performing manual investigation, and various tradeoffs
between accuracy and larger coverage.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work focuses on detecting early-stage infections within
enterprise perimeters, including communications related to
malware delivery and C&C. There has been a large body of
work in this area, but to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to exploit the relationship between malicious domains
associated with the same attack campaign, and to detect them
by a graph-theoretic framework based on belief propagation.
We describe here related work in the literature.
Detection of C&C communication. Some of the previous
work detecting C&C domains in botnets require malware
samples as input to detect connections with similar patterns
(e.g., BotFinder[37], Jackstraws[22]). Anomaly-based botnet
detection systems (e.g., BotMiner[16], BotSniffer[18] and
TAMD [41]) typically detect clusters of multiple synchronized
hosts infected by the same malware. In contrast to these, our
approach does not require malware samples and can detect a
single compromised host contacting the C&C server.
DISCLOSURE [8] identifies C&C traffic using features
extracted from NetFlow records but incorporates external in-
telligence sources to reduce false positives. Our C&C detector
is different in that it leverages enterprise-specific features
extracted from HTTP connections. From that perspective,
ExecScent [28] is close to our work in detecting C&C com-
munications in large enterprise network. However, ExecS-
cent needs malware samples to extract templates representing
malicious C&C connections. The templates are adapted to
a specific enterprise considering the popularity of different
features (URL patterns, user-agent strings, etc.). Our work
complements ExecScent in detecting new unknown malware
that can be provided as input to the template generation
module.
Detection of malware delivery. Nazca [21] analyzes web
requests from ISP networks to identify traffic related to
malware delivery and unveils malicious distribution networks.
CAMP [32] determines reputation of binary downloads in
the browser and predicts malicious activities. BotHunter [17]
identifies sequences of events during infection, as observed
from a network perimeter. Our approach does not depend
on specific events occurring during infection (which can be
changed easily or may not be observable), but more focused on
detecting related malicious domains and compromised hosts.
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Detection of malicious domains. Domains used in malicious
activities are backed by highly resilient infrastructures to deal
with takedowns or blacklisting, and hence exhibit unique char-
acteristics distinct from benign sites. Another branch of work
detects domains involved in malicious activities by patterns
observed in DNS traffic (e.g., EXPOSURE [9], Notos [5],
Kopis [6], and Antonakakis et al. [7]). Paxson et al. [30] detect
malicious communication established through DNS tunnels.
Carter et al. [10] use community detection for identifying
highly localized malicious domains in the IP space.
Anomaly detection in enterprise network. Beehive [40]
is an unsupervised system identifying general anomalies in
an enterprise setting including policy violations and malware
distribution. Our work is specifically targeting enterprise in-
fections which pose high risk and potential financial loss.
Targeted attacks. The threats in cyberspace keep evolving and
more sophisticated attacks recently emerged. Some targeted
attacks (APT) are well-funded, carefully orchestrated and
persist in the victim environments for years before detection.
Detecting targeted attacks in general is a very challenging
task. These attacks are usually very stealthy and able to evade
existing defenses [3]. However during the automated infection
stage many campaigns (e.g., Shady RAT [20], Mirage [12],
APT1 [26]) exhibit similar infection patterns. Recent studies
have shown that even though in theory APTs could be ar-
bitrarily sophisticated, in practice goal-oriented attackers use
relatively low levels of sophistication [38], [27], [24]. We
leverage some common patterns observed during the infection
stage to build a detector tailored to an enterprise. Our detection
result on the LANL’s APT infection discovery challenge indi-
cates that our techniques have potential in detecting infections
originated from targeted attacks.
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Attackers could in principle use a number of techniques
to evade our detectors. For instance, they may communicate
through different channels than HTTP/HTTPs but other ports
are commonly blocked at enterprise borders. Attackers could
also compromise popular web sites for delivering malicious
payloads or C&C communications. However, this is not
broadly observed. The analysis of traffic to popular sites
require different models and assumptions, due to the amount
of (benign) noise. As another evasion technique, attackers
can randomize timing patterns to C&C servers, but according
to published reports ([26]) this is uncommon. Our dynamic
histogram method is resilient against small amounts of ran-
domization introduced by attackers. Detecting C&C commu-
nication with completely randomized timing patterns (without
having access to malware samples and without correlating
activity from multiple hosts) is a challenging problem to the
community. Nevertheless, we believe that the infection patterns
that we detect are quite prevalent in many attacks.
The approach we proposed is meant to complement the
existing tools rather than replace them. The results from §VI
demonstrate that our belief propagation algorithm in both vari-
ants (SOC hints and no-hint) detects new suspicious activities
overlooked by deployed defense mechanisms. These include
both domains associated with existing malware campaigns
(and identified by VirusTotal), but with new presence in the
enterprise of our study, as well as entirely new malware cam-
paigns (not yet detected by anti-virus technologies). Since our
methods are focused on detecting the initial infection stages
of a campaign it is difficult to determine how many of these
suspicious activities are related to more advanced attacks, and
how many are mainstream malware variants. We believe that
monitoring activity to these suspicious domains over longer
periods of time, as well as correlating with information from
other data sources will answer this question, and we leave this
as an interesting avenue for future work.
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APPENDIX
Below we report two interesting communities of malicious
domains and compromised hosts detected by our techniques.
Figure 7 illustrates an example of a community of ma-
licious domains detected in the no-hint mode on 2/13.
We start from detecting suspicious C&C domains (24 do-
mains are identified that day). We pick for illustration one
(usteeptyshehoaboochu.ru) contacted by three hosts reg-
ularly at the same period (120 seconds). This domain is
confirmed by VirusTotal and is associated with a malware
labeled by Sophos as Troj/Agent-AGLT. Starting from
this C&C domain, belief propagation iteratively discovers two
other domains confirmed by VirusTotal (likely the delivery
stage) and two other hosts connecting to them.
Hosts
Domains
 ost
parfumonline.in
neoparfumonline.in
usteeptyshehoaboochu.ru
Beacon with 20s
 ost2
 ost3
Beacon with 20s
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Beacon with 20s
 ost5
Fig. 7: Example community of compromised hosts and de-
tected domains in no-hint mode on 2/13.
Figure 8 illustrates a community of domains detected in
the SOC hints mode on 2/10. To bootstrap the detection, we
use domain xtremesoftnow.ru from the SOC database as
a seed. This appears to be a C&C server for Zeus botnet.
The domain is accessed by Host 5 which is confirmed
infected by the SOC team. Host 5 contacted 7 domains
registered under TLD .org. Four of them are confirmed by
SOC and also reported by Sophos as contacted by different
malwares (Troj Ramdo-B, Troj Ramdo-K, Troj Ramdo-V
and Troj Symmi-S). This indicates that the compromised ma-
chine downloaded additional malware after the initial compro-
mise. Two of the remaining .org domains are not confirmed
by SOC but alarmed by VirusTotal. Interestingly, one domain
(uogwoigiuweyccsw.org) has a similar naming pattern with
other malicious domains, but is not picked up by either
SOC or VirusTotal. This is an example of new discovered
domain. The second iteration of belief propagation discovers
six additional hosts contacting a similar set of domains as
Host 5, indicating that they could be infected with the same
malware. Besides, four other suspicious domains are also
identified as contacted by these hosts, with three of them
confirmed by VirusTotal (including one automated domain)
and only one (cdn.tastyreview.com) being legitimate.
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Fig. 8: Example community of compromised hosts and de-
tected domains in SOC hints mode on 2/10. The yellow
diamond-shape domain is used as seed, purple ellipse-shape
domains are detected by VirusTotal and red hexagon-shape
domains are confirmed malicious by SOC. The grey rectangle-
shape domains are not confirmed by any existing tools at
the time of detection. The hostnames are anonymized. Red
hexagon-shape hosts are confirmed by SOC and purple ellipse-
shape ones are other compromised hosts.
